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Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 





                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
 Brownstone Specialty Finance, Inc. appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing its complaint against Freedom Mortgage 
Corporation. We will affirm, essentially for the reasons stated in the District Court’s 
thorough opinion. 
I 
  Brownstone provided commercial loan origination referral services to Freedom 
under a services agreement that became effective on September 1, 2014. Under the 
agreement, Brownstone earned a consultant fee once each loan was closed. The 
consultant fee was “based upon the profitability of the sale of the loan into a capital 
markets/securitization structure for any such borrower referral,” App. 30, and was 
calculated based on an attached fee schedule. The fee schedule stated that Brownstone 
was “entitled to 12% of realized Net Profits from the sale of each referred loan,” and it 
allowed Brownstone to receive an advance of $20,000 per month “against expected 
earned Consultant Fees.” App. 36. The parties were required to reconcile those draws 
quarterly against any consultant fees actually earned. 
The services agreement permitted either party to terminate it “at any time for any 
reason” after giving 30 days written notice. App. 32. Nearly two years after their 
arrangement began, Freedom terminated the agreement by letter dated July 5, 2016. After 
Freedom failed to pay the monthly draw for June, July, and the first week of August, 
Brownstone brought suit, asserting claims for breach of contract and unpaid commissions 
in violation of the New Jersey Sales Representatives’ Rights Act (SRRA), N.J. Stat. Ann. 
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§§ 2A:61A-1–2. In support of its SRRA claim, Brownstone alleged that the monthly 
draws were “commissions” under the Act.  
The District Court granted Freedom’s motion to dismiss the SRRA claim, 
concluding that “neither the Monthly Draw, nor the Consultant Fee qualify as a 
‘commission’ within the meaning of the Act.” Brownstone Specialty Fin., Inc. v. 
Freedom Mortg. Corp., 2017 WL 2829607, at *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017). 
II1 
 Brownstone argues that the District Court adopted an impermissibly narrow 
reading of “commissions” under the SRRA and relied on other states’ statutes instead of 
New Jersey caselaw to reach that conclusion. We disagree. 
The SRRA protects sales representatives against the nonpayment of commissions. 
Specifically, the Act provides:  
When a contract between a principal and a sales representative to solicit 
orders is terminated, the commissions and other compensation earned as a 
result of the representative relationship and unpaid shall become due and 
payable within 30 days of the date the contract is terminated or within 30 
days of the date commissions are due, whichever is later. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:61A-2. The SRRA defines “commission” as “compensation accruing 
to a sales representative for payment by a principal, . . . the rate of which is expressed as a 
percentage of the dollar amount of orders or sales or as a specified amount per order or 
per sale.” Id. § 2A:61A-1(a). 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s order granting a 
motion to dismiss. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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As the District Court found, monthly advances against the profit-based consultant 
fees that Brownstone expected to earn are not commissions protected by the SRRA. The 
SRRA defines “commission” as compensation based on one of two formulas: (1) a 
percentage of the dollar amount of orders or sales; or (2) a specified amount per order or 
per sale. Id. Here, Brownstone’s $20,000 monthly draw was “fixed, and independent of 
the number of sales of loans referred by Brownstone.” Brownstone, 2017 WL 2829607, at 
*4. Moreover, its consultant fee was compensation “based on a percentage of net 
profitability of the sale of the loans referred by Brownstone,” whereas the “express 
language of the SRRA encompasses percentage-based commission . . . only where the 
percentage-base is tied to ‘the dollar amount of orders or sales.’” Id. (quoting N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:61A-1(a)) (emphasis added). 
Brownstone faults the District Court for failing to cite controlling precedent 
interpreting the SRRA’s definition of “commission,” but it fails to offer any authority to 
support its position. Brownstone is correct that the SRRA and similar laws “have been 
liberally construed in order to fulfill their ‘humanitarian and remedial’ purposes.” Kas 
Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 972 A.2d 413, 429 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) 
(citation omitted). It is also the case, however, that a statute’s plain language is the “best 
indicator” of legislative intent. State v. Gandhi, 989 A.2d 256, 264 (N.J. 2010). Indeed, 
the New Jersey Legislature has instructed that, when construing its statutes, “words and 
phrases shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with 
the manifest intent of the Legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly 
indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 1:1-1. As the 
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District Court explained, neither the monthly advance nor the consultant fee qualifies as a 
“commission” under the language of the SRRA. Brownstone, 2017 WL 2829607, at *3. 
Nor did the District Court err when it cited statutes from other states to support its 
interpretation of the SRRA. Those references persuasively supported the District Court’s 
interpretation to the extent they showed that other state legislatures “have specifically 
included in the definition of ‘commission’ those that are derived from a percentage-base 
of profits.” Id. at *4 (citing N.C. Gen Stat. Ann. § 66-190(1); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, 
§ 676; Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl. § 3-601(b); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1335.11(A)(1)). 
“Unlike these states, the New Jersey SRRA does not expressly include in the definition of 
commission . . . percentage-based compensation derived from profits.” Id.; see also 
Schwab v. Nat’l Dealers Warranty, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“Whether the term ‘commission’ should be extended to include payments based on a 
percentage of profits is a question for the legislature rather than the judiciary.”). 
Because Brownstone was not due any “commissions” as defined by the SRRA, the 
District Court did not err in dismissing its SRRA claim. We will therefore affirm. 
